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FESTO'S EFFECT ON AFTER-ARISING TECHNOLOGY
AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Anthony H- Azure
Abstract: In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., the Federal Circuit
adopted a strict approach to prosecution history estoppel and thereby limited the availability
of the doctrine of equivalents to patentees suing for infringement by after-arising technology.
The court held that when a narrowing claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel,
the amended claim element maintains no range of equivalents and therefore the patentee is
completely barred from applying the doctrine of equivalents. The court rejected the flexible
approach, which allows a scope of equivalents even after a narrowing claim amendment. This
Note argues that the Supreme Court should overrule the Festo decision and adopt the flexible
approach to prosecution history estoppel in cases of infringement by after-arising technology.
The strict approach adopted by Festo hinders the doctrine of equivalents in protecting
patentees from infringement by after-arising technology. The Festo majority misinterpreted
the Supreme Court's opinion in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., which
implies that a scope of equivalents is available after a narrowing claim amendment has been
made for patentability reasons. In addition, the Festo decision leads to incongruous results
with respect to after-arising technology, as it protects unamended claims but not amended
claims, and predictable arts but not unpredictable arts. Furthermore, Festo conflicts with
patent policy, which rewards pioneer inventions with a broad range of equivalents. Finally,
this flexible approach would give patentees fair protection from infringement by after-arising
technology under the doctrine of equivalents.
The United States patent system is designed to promote the public
disclosure of innovation. In exchange for publicly disclosing a new
invention, a patentee gains the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention.' The U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have recognized that copyists should not be able to avoid
infringement by using after-arising technology to make insubstantial
substitutions in a patented invention The courts have defined after-
arising technology as technological developments known after issuance
of a patent. In order to protect patentees from such insubstantial
substitutions, the courts developed the doctrine of equivalents. Under the
doctrine of equivalents, a patentee can claim infringement when an
accused device is not an exact copy of the patented invention, but an
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
2. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
3. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37; Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Litton, 140 F.3d at 1457; see also MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES
§ 3.411], at 3-40.17 to 3-40.18 (2d ed. 2001).
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element of the accused device performs substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.
4
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,5 the Federal
Circuit, sitting en banc, resolved several issues involving the doctrine of
equivalents.6 In the most divisive issue, the court held that a narrowing
claim amendment creates a "complete bar" to the application of the
doctrine of equivalents to the amended claim element.7 The majority
reasoned that this would promote the public notice function of patents
and create more certainty in the patent system.8 Several dissenting judges
sharply disagreed, arguing that the decision contradicted Supreme Court
and Federal Circuit precedent,9 would promote copying of patented
inventions,"° and failed to address its effect on the role played by the
doctrine of equivalents in preventing infringement by after-arising
technology. "
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should overrule Festo's
"complete bar" rule and adopt a flexible approach to prosecution history
estoppel in cases of infringement by after-arising technology. Parts I and
II give an overview of patent law and the doctrine of equivalents. Part III
examines the relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and after-
arising technology. Part IV summarizes the facts and opinions of Festo.
Part V argues that Festo's strict approach prevents the doctrine of
equivalents from accommodating after-arising technology, that the Festo
majority opinion leads to incompatible results when applied in cases
involving after-arising technology, and that the decision conflicts with
the patent policy of rewarding pioneer inventions with broad claim
scope. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should permit the
flexible approach in all cases of infringement by after-arising technology.
4. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
5. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3779 (June 18, 2001) (No.
00-1543).
6. Id. at 563-64.
7. Id. at 569.
8. Id. at 575.
9. Id. at 598, 612 (Michel, J., dissenting), 620 (Linn, J., dissenting), 630 (Newman, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 616 (Michel, J., dissenting), 627 (Linn, J., dissenting), 635-36 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1. Id. at 619 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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I. PATENT LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
An inventor begins the process of obtaining a patent by sending the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) an application explaining an
invention in detail. A patent issues to the inventor once the PTO
determines that the application meets certain statutory requirements.
After issuance of a patent, the inventor can sue for patent infringement
those who make, use, or sell the invention without authority.'2 During
litigation, the court will compare the patent to the accused device. The
court can find infringement if the accused device is an exact copy of the
patented invention (literal infringement) or if the accused device has
elements similar enough to the claimed invention to be equivalent
(doctrine of equivalents). In order to prevent a patentee from abusing the
doctrine, the doctrine of equivalents is subject to various limitations.
A. The Patent Application Process
The Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over patents as
enumerated by the U.S. Constitution'3 and codified by the 1952 Patent
Act.'" The process of issuing patents is governed by the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO).'5 A patent gives its holder, the patentee, the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented
invention for twenty years after the patent application is filed. 6 The PTO
grants patents to persons who invent something that is new, useful, and
nonobvious. 7
Under the Patent Act, a patent application must meet three
Section 112 requirements of patentability: written description,
enablement, and best mode.'" The specification must contain a written
description of the invention in sufficient detail so that one skilled in the
art could reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries... .
14. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2001).
15. Id. § 153.
16. Id. § 154.
17. Id. §§ 101-03.
18. Id. § 112.
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invention as of the filing date. 9 Under the enablement requirement, the
specification must describe the invention in enough detail to enable a
person skilled in the art to make and use the invention without "undue
experimentation. 20 Finally, the specification must also include the "best
mode" that the inventor knows to carry out the invention.2'
In addition, the applicant's invention must meet the statutory
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.22  Novelty and
nonobviousness are measured against "prior art," which includes issued
patents, patent applications pending at the PTO, and publications
disclosing technological discoveries. 23 Novelty requires the invention to
be something new.24 Nonobviousness requires the invention be more than
an obvious variation of the prior art as measured by a person with
ordinary skill in the art.2
The process of applying for a patent involves a series of negotiations
between an applicant and a PTO Examiner. Applications that do not meet
statutory requirements are rejected by the Examiner. 6 If the Examiner
rejects an application, he or she prepares a document informing the
applicant that the application has been rejected and stating the reasons
for rejection. 7 The applicant may then respond to the Examiner's
rejection, either by arguing that the application complies with statutory
requirements, or by amending the rejected claims, or both. 8 Nearly all
applications are amended during the application process.2 9 The Examiner
will consider the applicant's arguments and amendments and either issue
a patent or reject the claims again. 0 This process continues until the
19. Id. § 112; Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
22. Id. § 102-03.
23. Id. § 102; ALAN L. DURHAI, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 80 (1999).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
25. Id. § 103.
26. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2000).
27. Id. § 1.104(a)(2).
28. Id. § 1.111.
29. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court To Review Case That Redefined Patent Doctrine, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2001, at C9; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., April 9, 2001, at 2 (stating
that the vast majority of the 1.2 million patents now in force were amended dunng prosecution);
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting the common
practice of amending claims during the patent application process).
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.112 (2000).
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Examiner grants an allowance or the Examiner issues a Final Rejection."
A Final Rejection may first be appealed to the PTO Board of Patent
Appeals, and then to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.32 Once
a patent issues, the record of the proceedings before the PTO, also called
the "prosecution history,"" is made available to the public.34 The
prosecution history is reviewed during patent litigation in determining
whether a patent has been infringed.35
B. Patent Infringement
A patent gives its holder the right to sue those who infringe the
patented invention. In order to determine whether a patent has been
infringed, courts must employ a two-step analysis. 6 First, a court must
interpret the meaning of the claims by examining the claim language, the
patent specification, and the prosecution history.37 Once a court has
determined the meaning of the claims, it must determine whether the
patent has been infringed by comparing each element of the patent's
claims to the accused device.38 At this second step, called infringement
analysis, a court may find infringement under one of two theories: literal
infringement or the doctrine of equivalents.39 The accused device must
contain each and every element of the claimed invention, either literally
or equivalently, to infringe the patent.4"
To prove literal infringement, a patentee must show that an accused
device contains every element of a claimed invention.4 Literal
infringement has the benefit of providing the public clear notice as to
31. Id. §§ 1.113 (final rejection), 1.311 (notice of allowance).
32. Id. §§ 1.191 (appeal to Board of Patent Appeals), 1.301 (appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit).
33. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 18.05, at 18-413 (2000).
34. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11.
35. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (claim
interpretation); CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18.05, at 18-413 to 18-415.
36. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
37. Id. (referring to this process as claim interpretation).
38. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[A]ny deviation
from the claim precludes a finding of literal infringement.").
1157
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what subject matter a patent covers.42 However, literal infringement fails
to prevent copyists from pirating claimed inventions by making
insubstantial substitutions to the invention's claim elements.43 Therefore,
the courts developed the doctrine of equivalents to prevent such
copying.44
The doctrine of equivalents provides patentees fair protection against
infringement, freeing claim language from its literal meaning.45 Under
the doctrine of equivalents, a patentee can claim infringement by
showing that elements of the accused device are equivalent to a claim
limitation.46 In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co.,47 the Supreme Court recognized the "triple identity" test for
equivalency.4 8 Under the test, elements of an accused device are
equivalent to a claim limitation if they perform "substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."49
The doctrine of equivalents strikes a balance between two competing
policies of the patent system: providing public notice of patented
inventions and providing patentees protection for their inventions.50 On
the one hand, the doctrine provides patentees greater protection than that
afforded under literal infringement by preventing "unscrupulous
copyists" from avoiding infringement by making insubstantial changes to
a patented invention."1 This greater protection is necessary to encourage
public disclosure of inventions.52 If inventors are not confident that
patent law will protect their inventions, they will be more likely to hide




46. Id. at 610.
47. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
48. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997) (referring to
language in the Graver Tank decision as the "triple identity" test).
49. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)).
50. Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court's Warner-
Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1,7 (1998).
51. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 34.
52. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
1158
Vol. 76:1153, 2001
Festo and After-Arising Technology
their discoveries, thereby inhibiting other researchers from making
further innovations. 3
On the other hand, the doctrine of equivalents can blur the boundaries
defining what a patent protects. When applied broadly, to cover a large
scope of equivalents, the doctrine "conflicts with the definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement."5 4
Adequate notice is necessary to permit sound predictions about the
outcome of infringement litigation,"5 thereby allowing other researchers
to make developments in the same area without fear of litigation.
56
Therefore, while the doctrine of equivalents provides patentees valuable
infringement protection, it should not provide such protection by
completely sacrificing the notice function of claims.57
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The courts have developed certain limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents to prevent the doctrine from eliminating the notice function
of claims. Among these limitations is prosecution history estoppel, which
limits the availability of the doctrine of equivalents to a patentee in
infringement litigation. In addition, courts have crafted other limitations,
which include the "all elements" rule and the "prior art" limitation.
A. Prosecution History Estoppel and the Warner-Jenkinson
Presumption
Prosecution history estoppel prevents a patent holder from using the
doctrine of equivalents in litigation to reach subject matter surrendered
during the patent application process. The Supreme Court created the
Warner-Jenkinson presumption to handle situations in which the reason
for a claim amendment is unclear from the prosecution history. In such a
case, the Court allows no scope of equivalents for the amended claim
element.
53. See id.
54. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
55. Martin J. Adelman & Gary L Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 682 (1989).
56. Id. at 682-83 (this situation is referred to as "design around").
57. Chisum, supra note 50, at 7.
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1. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel prevents a patentee from claiming subject
matter that the patentee surrendered during prosecution of the patent. 8
During prosecution, a patentee may have to make narrowing claim
amendments to overcome patentability rejections by the PTO,5 9 and
thereby surrender subject matter that the claims initially covered. In such
a case, the patentee is estopped from reaching this subject matter during
litigation if the record shows that it was relinquished during
60prosecution.
Prior to Festo, Federal Circuit precedent supported both a "flexible"
and a "strict" approach to the scope of equivalents available after
prosecution history estoppel. 6' The vast majority of cases took the
flexible approach.6" Under the flexible approach, a narrowing claim
amendment does not automatically bar application of the doctrine of
equivalents to a claim element.63 Instead, a court examines the
prosecution history to determine what scope of equivalents remains. 4
After examining the record, a court may still find that the doctrine of
equivalents is precluded if the potential infringer clearly failed to reach
the amended element's remaining subject matter.6" Two Federal Circuit
cases employed a strict approach.6 Under the strict approach, a court
refuses to examine the reasons for the claim amendment in the
58. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
59. Id.
60. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1997).
61. Compare Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, 172 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Litton
Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc, 140 F.3d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
140 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (flexible approach) with Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Prodyne Enters., Inc. v. Julie Ponerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (strict
approach).
62. CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18.05[3][b][i], at 18-497, 18-503.
63. Hughes, 140 F.3d at 1476-77.
64. Id. at 1476.
65. Id. at 1477.
66. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d 383, 389; Prodyne, 743 F.2d 1581, 1583; see also Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Michel, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the two cases following the strict approach can be reconciled with the
flexible approach cases), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3779 (June 18, 2001) (No. 00-1543); CHiSUM,
supra note 33, § 18.05[3][b][i], at 18-496.
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prosecution history and simply precludes applying the doctrine of
equivalents to the amended claim element.67
2. The Wamer-Jenldnson Presumption
The Supreme Court crafted an important corollary to prosecution
history estoppel in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.68
Warner-Jenkinson involved a patent owned by Hilton Davis that covered
a process for purifying food and drug dyes.69 The patent claimed that the
process operated "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0."7o Subsequent
to the issuance of the Hilton Davis patent, Wamer-Jenkinson developed a
similar filtration process that operated at a pH of 5.0.7' As a result, Hilton
Davis sued Wamer-Jenkinson for patent infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.'
At issue in the case was the reason Hilton Davis had limited its patent
to a pH level of 6.0. When Hilton Davis initially filed its patent
application with the PTO, it did not contain a specific pH level
limitation.' The pH limit of 6.0 was later added to the claims.74 Under
prosecution history estoppel, amendments made for patentability reasons
bar the patentee from claiming subject matter given up by the-
amendment. Yet, because the record did not explain why Hilton Davis
had added the lower pH limit of 6.0, it was unclear whether Hilton Davis
should be allowed to reach a pH level of 5.0 through the doctrine of
equivalents.75
In ruling on the case, the Supreme Court crafted what has become
known as the "Warner-Jenkinson presumption. 76 When no explanation
for a claim amendment is established, a court should presume that the
applicant amended the claim due to a "substantial reason related to
67. CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18.05[3][b], at 18-492, 18-496.
68. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id. at 23.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 41.
76. Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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patentablility. '' 77 In such cases, a court should completely bar the
patentee from claiming any equivalents for that particular claim element
unless the patentee can show an "appropriate reason for a required
amendment. '78 Prosecution history estoppel precludes the application of
the doctrine of equivalents to that amended claim element. 9
Warner-Jenkinson did not specifically rule on whether a claim
element maintains a scope of equivalents after prosecution history
estoppel.80 However, Federal Circuit cases," as well as commentators,82
have interpreted Warner-Jenkinson as promoting a scope of equivalents
after a narrowing claim amendment made for reasons related to
patentability. In Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc.,83 the
Federal Circuit closely examined Warner-Jenkinson's language and
rejected the notion that the Supreme Court meant that all claim
amendments for reasons related to patentability created a "complete bar"
to the doctrine of equivalents.84 Instead, the "complete bar" rule of the
presumption applies only when the patentee fails to establish a reason for
the claim amendment. 85
B. Other Limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents
The courts have developed other limitations that prevent a patentee
from abusing the doctrine of equivalents by stretching claim language
beyond what the inventor has created. Under the "all elements" rule,
each and every element of a claimed invention must be found in an
77. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18.05[3][c], at 18-508 to 18-509.
81. SextantAvionique, 172 F.3d at 831; Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he entire context of the Wamer-Jenkinson opinion shows that the Supreme
Court approved the PTO's practice of requesting amendments with the understanding that the
doctrine of equivalents would still apply to the amended language."); id. at 1457 ("Nowhere did the
Supreme Court suggest that such after-arising equivalents would be barred as a matter of law
whenever a claim is amended to overcome prior art before the examiner."); see also Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("In evaluating the reason behind an
amendment [related to patenability], a court must determine what subject matter the patentee
actually surrendered.") (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33 n.7)).
82. ADELMAN, supra note 3, § 3.5, at 3-42.49 to 3-42.50; Chisum, supra note 50, at 57-58.
83. 172 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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accused device. 6 The doctrine of equivalents must be applied to
individual elements of the claim and not to the invention as a whole.87 A
"one-to-one correspondence" between elements of the claimed invention
and the accused device is not necessary.88 An element of the patent claim
can be infringed by a single component of the accused device or a series
of components can be combined to make up the claim element.89 The
prior art limitation prevents a patentee from trying to claim something
through the doctrine of equivalents that the patent holder could not claim
during the patent application process." The scope of equivalents of a
claim element may not reach inventions already disclosed by the prior
art.9'
Im. INFRINGEMENT PROTECTION AGAINST AFTER-ARISING
TECHNOLOGY
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent underscore the need for
the doctrine of equivalents to protect patentees from after-arising
technology. The courts define after-arising technology as equivalents that
were not known at the time of patent issuance. Related to after-arising
technology and the doctrine of equivalents is the pioneer invention
doctrine. A pioneer invention is an endeavor in a new field. Pioneer
inventions are usually infringed by after-arising technology and,
consequently, often rely on the doctrine of equivalents for infringement
protection. Lastly, inventions in the unpredictable arts depend on the
doctrine of equivalents to cover infringement by after-arising technology.
A. A Primary Purpose of the Doctrine of Equivalents Is To Provide
Infringement Protection Against After-Arising Technology
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have both emphasized that
a primary purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to protect patentees
86. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane); see
also Hughes, 140 F.3d at 1474.
87. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,29 (1997).
88. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
89. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
90. Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
91. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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from after-arising technology. 92 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the argument that equivalents should not extend to
after-arising technology, by fixing the time when equivalency should be
measured. 93 The Court ruled that equivalency should be measured at the
time of infringement, not as of the patent issue date. 94 Because
knowledge of interchangeability is objective, equivalency is not limited
to what was known in the art at the time the patent was issued.95
Therefore, the doctrine of equivalents can apply to after-arising
technology. 96
The Federal Circuit has applied the doctrine of equivalents to after-
arising technology. 97 In doing so, it has stressed that "[p]atent policy
supports application of the doctrine of equivalents to a claim
element.., in the case of 'after-arising' technology because a patent
draftsman has no way to anticipate and account for later developed
substitutes for a claim element." 98 According to the Federal Circuit, this
is necessary to prevent infringers from pirating an invention by using
new technology to make an insubstantial change in the claimed
invention.99
For example, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 0° the Federal
Circuit found the after-arising technology presented by the accused
device equivalent to the claimed invention under the doctrine of
equivalents.'' Hughes involved a patent disclosing a device for
controlling the orientation of a spacecraft from a ground control
station."°2 The accused device employed microprocessors, not available
at the time the patent application was filed, to compute some of the
92. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37; Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Pall Corp. v.
Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1995).




97. See, e.g., Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1220; Hughes, 140 F.3d at 1477.
98. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321 n.2 (referring to means-plus-function
claims).
99. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane).
100. 140 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
101. Hughes, 140 F.3d at 1477.
102. Id. at 1475.
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positioning requirements on board. °3 The court determined that the
change was the result of technology not available until after the patent
issued.'O' The only difference was that the function was being performed
on board the satellite instead of on the ground.'05 Therefore, the accused
device infringed the patent under the doctrine of equivalents."
B. "Pioneer " Inventions
A pioneer invention is one that creates an entirely new function or
makes a distinctive leap in science. 10 7 Broad literal claims can be written
for pioneer inventions because, by definition, pioneer inventions are not
restricted by prior art.l"' Accordingly, pioneer inventions will have no
prosecution history relating to prior art rejections. However, pioneer
inventions are susceptible to rejections under Section 112 because the
patent drafter and the Examiner are trying to interpret a new field of
technology.' 9 As a result, applications for pioneer patents are frequently
amended because language in the patent application typically needs
refinement as the inventor works toward patent issuance]'0
Infringement protection against after-arising technology is a particular
concern for pioneer inventions. Pioneer inventions are often infringed by
after-arising technology because they are advances in a new area of
science."' Infringement will occur from developments made after the
invention becomes public. Therefore, pioneer inventions need the
103. Id. at 1472-73; see also CHiSUM, supra note 33, § 18.04(3)(c), at 18-386.
104. Id. at 1475.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1477.
107. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537,569 (1898).
108. Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
109. Moore v. United States, 211 U.S.P.Q. 800, 806 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
110. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 622 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (Linn, J., dissenting) ("For inventions in rapidly evolving fields, application filings are
often made while the inventions are still in nascent stages, i.e., early in the evolutionary process,
necessitating inevitable and sometimes considerable fine tuning of claim language after the initial
application filings have been made."); id. at 624 (Linn, J., dissenting) ("[E]liminating all flexibility
in the scope of claim limitations amended for a statutory purpose reflects unjustified faith in the
draftsperson to select language to perfectly describe a new and unobvious invention at an early stage
of the development process.").
111. Matthew C. Phillips, Taking a Step Beyond Maxwell To Tame the Doctrine of Equivalents,
I1 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 155, 183-84 (2000).
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doctrine of equivalents for fair protection against infringers who utilize
after-arising technology to avoid literal infringement.
Pioneer inventions gain a broad range of equivalents during an
infringement suit because application of the doctrine of equivalents is not
limited by prior art or prosecution history estoppel." 2 Pioneer inventions
are not analyzed under a different standard than other inventions, but the
nature of pioneer inventions usually results in broad equivalents." 3 A
broader range of equivalents for pioneering inventions serves as an
incentive for greater leaps in innovation. This incentive is necessary
because research into a new area is expensive and time-consuming, and
potentially unsuccessful." 4 Hence, the inventor who succeeds in
developing a pioneering invention deserves to be rewarded with a broad
range of equivalents." 5
C. Unpredictable Arts
Inventions in the unpredictable arts cannot capture after-arising
technology through broad claims because of a failure to meet the
enablement requirement of patentability. Due to the difficulty in meeting
the enablement requirement, patents of unpredictable arts typically must
have narrower claims than those covering the predictable arts." 6 To meet
the statutory enablement requirement, the inventor must describe the
invention in enough detail to enable a person skilled in the art to make
and use the invention without "undue experimentation.' '7 One of the
factors to consider when determining whether a disclosure requires
112. Augustine Med., 181 F.3d at 1301.
113. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
see also Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
'pioneer' is not a separate class of invention, carrying a unique body of law. The wide range of
technological advance between pioneering breakthrough and modest improvement accommodates
gradations in scope of equivalency.").
114. Christinia Y. Lai, Comment: A Dysfunctional Formalism: How Modern Courts Are
Undermining the Doctrine of Equivalents, 44 UCLA L. REV. 2031, 2040 (1997).
115. Id.; see also John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions,
10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 58-59 (1995).
116. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that broad claims to genetic antisense
technology, which had been rejected 10 times by PTO for lack of enablement before being allowed,
were invalid for lack of enablement).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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"undue experimentation" is the predictability or unpredictability of the
art of the invention." 8
The Federal Circuit has routinely found broad claims in the
unpredictable arts to be invalid because they fail to meet the enablement
requirement." 9 To meet the enablement requirement, the unpredictable
arts require a higher degree of disclosure. 2 For example, biotechnology
and chemistry are considered unpredictable arts because scientists cannot
predict how minor chemical changes will affect chemical reactions or
physiological activities. 2 ' Because of the unpredictability of the art, the
claims must more closely resemble the specific embodiments disclosed
in the specification." The inventor must present several working
examples of an unpredictable art to show that no undue experimentation
is required for a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed
invention. A patent on an unpredictable art cannot support a broad claim
because application of the disclosed embodiments involves processes
that science does not yet fully understand."z Thus, a patent application in
the unpredictable arts with broad claims will most likely fail the
enablement requirement.
In contrast, patents covering predictable arts require less specificity to
meet the enablement requirement. Inventions in the predictable arts, such
as mechanical or electrical inventions, can enable broad claims. 24 One
embodiment of a predictable art supports a broad claim because
disclosure of one variation of the invention will enable a person skilled in
the art to substitute other variations without undue experimentation. 2 ' In
118. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The factbrs include: "(1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the
relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
breadth of the claims." Id.
119. See Margaret Sampson, Comment: The Evolution ofthe Enablement and Written Description
Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area ofBiotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1233,
1240-52 (2000).
120. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that higher level of disclosure is
required where "diverse and poorly understood" subject matter is involved).
121. Sampson, supra note 119, at 1240 (citing In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
122. DURHAM, supra note 23, at 72.
123. Sampson, supra note 119, at 1248.
124. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839; see also In re Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d
1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
125. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839; Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1533.
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the predictable arts, the claims do not have to closely mimic the
disclosed embodiments to satisfy the enablement requirement.
IV. AFTER FESTO, PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 126 the
Federal Circuit held that a narrowing claim amendment that creates
prosecution history estoppel completely bars application of the doctrine
of equivalents to the amended claim element. 127 The court reasoned that
the complete bar would ensure the notice function of claims by
eliminating the uncertainty in determining whether an element maintains
a scope of equivalents after a narrowing claim amendment. 2 The
Federal Circuit's strict approach gave rise to numerous dissents. The
dissenting judges argued that the majority decision contradicted
precedent, promoted copying, and discouraged technological
innovation. 9 The dissenters also stressed that the majority decision
would hinder a primary justification for the doctrine of equivalents:
providing patentees infringement protection against after-arising
technology. 30
A. Procedural History ofFesto
Festo involved an infringement lawsuit concerning two patents owned
by the Festo Corporation (Festo). Festo sued Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd. (also known as the SMC Corporation) and SMC
Pneumatics, Inc. (collectively referred to as SMC), in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts for patent infringement.131
Festo's patents disclosed an invention consisting of rodless cylinders that
are magnetically coupled to a yoke or other structure. 32 The district court
126. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3779 (June 18, 2001)
(No. 00-1543).
127. Id. at 564.
128. Id. at 576.
129. See infra Parts IV.C.1 and C.3.
130. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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found infringement of Festo's patents under the doctrine of
equivalents.'33 SMC appealed the findings of infringement to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which in turn affirmed the district
court's judgments.134
The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari by SMC. The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit
decision, and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for further
consideration in light of its holding in Warner-Jenkinson.35 On remand,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment with respect to one
of Festo's patents, 136 but vacated the judgment in regard to the other, and
remanded the case to the district court for re-determination. 37
The Federal Circuit granted a petition to rehear the appeal en banc.
38
The court's previous judgment was vacated and the accompanying
judgment withdrawn. 139 Although the court was presented with five
questions, this Note addresses the third question: If a claim amendment
creates prosecution history estoppel, under Warner-Jenkinson what range
of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for
the claim element so amended? 40




137. Id. at 1380-81.
138. Festo, 187 F.3d 1381, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
139. Id.
140. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en
banc), cert. granted, 69 U.S.LW. 3779 (June 18, 2001) (No. 00-1543). The court also addressed
four additional questions:
First, the court held that "a narrowing amendment made for any reason related to the statutory
requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with respect to the amended
claim element." Id. at 566.
Second, the court stated that "a voluntary amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for a
reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel
as to the amended claim element" Id. at 568.
Next, "when no explanation for a claim amendment is established, no range of equivalents is
available for the claim element so amended." Id. at 578.
Finally, the Federal Circuit declined to answer the fifth question because the court found no
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 578.
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B. The Majority Opinion
The Festo majority reasoned that "when a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no
range of equivalents available for the amended claim element.
Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is
completely barred."''4 Since narrowing claim amendments were made
during prosecution of the patents and Festo could not establish reasons
unrelated to patentability for the amendments, no range of equivalents
was available for the amended claim elements. 4 2 Thus, SMC did not
infringe either of Festo's patents. 143
The majority reviewed Supreme Court precedent, but found no cases
that had decided whether a claim element that was narrowed by an
amendment that gave rise to prosecution history estoppel was entitled to
a range of equivalents.'" According to the majority, Warner-Jenkinson
did not speak directly to the issue. 4 ' Rather, the majority found that
Warner-Jenkinson's holding applied only to a range of equivalents that is
available when there is no explanation for the amendment in the
prosecution history.' 46 Thus, the majority concluded that the Supreme
Court had never ruled on the precise issue before the Festo court.'47
Consequently, the majority turned to Federal Circuit precedent for
guidance, and identified two lines of authority-the strict approach and
the flexible approach.'48 The majority rejected the flexible approach for
several reasons. First, it stated that after nearly twenty years of
experience handling patent appeals, the flexible approach was
unworkable because it failed to produce consistent results that could be
relied upon by the marketplace. 49 Second, the flexible approach opposed
the notice function of claims and created uncertainty in patent law.5 In
contrast, the strict approach would create certainty-once a narrowing
141. Id. at 563-64.
142. Id. at 564.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 571.
145. Id. at 569.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 571.
148. Id. at 573-74.
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amendment for patentability is made, the patentee and the public have
notice that the element is limited to literal infringement.' Hence, neither
the public nor the patentee would need to pay for expensive litigation to
determine the remaining scope of equivalents after a narrowing
amendment. 2 Third, the strict approach would encourage technological
innovation.' The certainty and predictability created by the strict
approach would minimize the fear of litigation surrounding an amended
claim's remaining scope of equivalents.'54 Consequently, this would
stimulate investment in research and lead to greater innovation. 5
C. The Dissents
The dissenting judges disagreed with the majority's decision regarding
the scope of equivalents available after prosecution history estoppel. The
dissenters argued that Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent
advocated a flexible approach. They also predicted that Festo would lead
to an increase in blatant copying of patents, a decrease in the value of
issued patents, a decline in technological innovation, and a limitation on
the ability of the doctrine of equivalents to protect patentees from
infringement by after-arising technology.
1. The Majority Opinion Contradicts Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit Precedent
The dissenting judges rejected the majority's claim that the Supreme
Court had never spoken on the issue of the scope of equivalents after
prosecution history estoppel. 6 Judge Michel reviewed eight Supreme
Court cases dating back to the nineteenth century and concluded that
they established that a claim element may retain a range of equivalents
even after a patent applicant makes a narrowing claim amendment.'57




155. Id. at 577-78.
156. Festo, 234 F.3d at 601 (Michel, J., dissenting), 620 (Linn, J., dissenting), 631-32 (Newman,
J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 602-09 (Michel, J., dissenting). Judge Michel noted that the Supreme Court cited these




The dissenting judges also argued that the majority decision conflicted
with Warner-Jenkinson.'55 According to the dissenters, the Supreme
Court rejected a bright-line rule in Warner-Jenkinson, which would have
precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents to a claim
element that had been narrowed during prosecution. 5 9
Several of the dissenting judges argued that Federal Circuit precedent
overwhelmingly supported the flexible approach to prosecution history
estoppel. 6 ' Judge Michel characterized the majority position as a
"sudden shift" in the court's precedent because nearly all cases since
1983 took a flexible approach. 6' According to Judge Michel, only two
cases took the strict approach, and even those cases did not actually hold
that narrowing amendments are always a complete bar to infringement
by equivalents. 62 Rather, the courts in those two cases took a flexible
approach but found that the patentees had surrendered all of the pertinent
subject matter. 63
2. The Strict Approach Frustrates the Infringement Protection Against
After-Arising Technology Provided by the Doctrine of Equivalents
In his dissent, Judge Rader contended that the majority decision
ignored the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents-to protect patentees
from infringement by after-arising technology. Judge Rader stressed that
a primary justification for the doctrine of equivalents is to protect
patentees from infringement by after-arising technology.' 6 Without the
doctrine of equivalents, copyists could easily circumvent infringement by
substituting new technology for a claim element. 65 Furthermore, he
described Warner-Jenkinson as acknowledging that the doctrine of
158. Id. at 611--12, 616 (Michel, J., dissenting), 620 (Linn, J., dissenting), 631 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
159. Id. at 618 (Michel, J., dissenting), 620 (Linn, J., dissenting), 633 (Newman, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 610 (Michel, J., dissenting), 628 (Linn, J., dissenting), 634-35 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
161. Id. at 610 (Michel, J., dissenting). Judge Michel examined eases from 1983 to 2000 and
concluded that the court had approved the flexible approach in over 50 cases. Id. at 613 (Michel, J.,
dissenting).
162. Id. at 610 (Michel, J., dissenting) (citing Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir.
1984) and Prodyne Enters., Inc. v. Pomerantz, 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
163. Id. at 610-11 (Michel, J., dissenting); see also id. at 628-29 (Linn, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 619 (Rader, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
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equivalents accommodates after-arising technology. 66 Finally, Judge
Rader argued that the majority opinion "defies logic" because "[a]ll
patent protection for amended claims is lost when it comes to after-
arising technology, while the doctrine of equivalents will continue to
accommodate after-arising technology in unamended claims.' 167 Such an
outcome was illogical according to Judge Rader because after-arising
technology, by definition, does not exist at the time of patent issuance;
therefore, an applicant could not have given up such subject matter when
a claim was amended.1
68
3. The Strict Approach Will Promote Copying of Patented Inventions
and Stifle Innovation
The dissenters argued that the strict approach provides individuals
with a way to copy patented inventions without fear of infringement
liability.169 In Judge Michel's view, a savvy copyist could search the
prosecution history of a competitor and exploit an amended claim
element by substituting an equivalent in his own product. 7 ' In effect,
copyists get a free ride, using the prosecution history as a roadmap to
pirate the patentee's invention."
The dissenters also contended that potential copying will decrease the
value of issued patents and increase the cost of prosecuting a new
patent. 72 Unexpired patents, written under the assumption that courts
would take a flexible approach to prosecution history estoppel, would no
longer prevent copying. 73 According to the dissenters, the cost of
obtaining a patent will increase because it will become exceedingly
difficult to obtain a patent protected by the doctrine of equivalents. 74
Presently, patent applications frequently receive patentability rejections
and the applicant makes narrowing amendments in response.'75 However,
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 619-20 (Rader, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 616 (Michel, J., dissenting), 627 (Linn, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 616 (Michel, J., dissenting), 627 (Linn, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 618 (Michel, J., dissenting), 624 (Linn, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 618-19 (Michel, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 618 (Michel, J., dissenting), 624 (Linn, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 618-19 (Michel, J., dissenting), 622 (Linn, J., dissenting).
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according to the majority's opinion, an applicant who makes narrowing
claim amendments also relinquishes the doctrine of equivalents in future
litigation. 116 Therefore, an applicant who wishes to overcome any
patentability rejections and maintain the infringement protection
provided by the doctrine of equivalents is faced with two expensive
alternatives: appeal rejections to the PTO and the court'7 7 or engage in
extensive pre-filing prior art searches.' 78
The dissenters warned that the ease of copying patented inventions
could decrease technological innovation. 79 According to the dissenters,
inadequate protection of patents would lead to a loss of potential profits,
which in turn would lead to a decrease in investment for new
technological research. 8° In addition, incentives to license inventions
would be eliminated because the potential licensee could simply copy the
invention without fear of infringement.' 8' Furthermore, the costs
involved in an application appeals process would force some inventors to
abandon their inventions or maintain them as trade secrets. 82 In
particular, these extra costs of prosecution would hurt the individual
inventors and startup companies that the patent system was meant to
protect. 83 In the end, according to the dissenters, the extra cost would
also harm the public, as it is the public who suffers when an inventor
fails to disclose an invention. 84
V. FESTO UNDERMINES THE PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS AND LEAVES PATENTEES WITHOUT
RECOURSE AGAINST INFRINGEMENT BY AFTER-ARISING
TECHNOLOGY
The Festo court erred in implementing the strict approach to
prosecution history estoppel as it virtually eliminates infringement
protection against after-arising technology provided by the doctrine of
176. Id. at 563-64.
177. Id. at 618 (Michel, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 624 (Linn, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 624 (Linn, J., dissenting), 641 (Newman, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 627 (Linn, J., dissenting), 641 (Newman, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 619 (Michel, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 618 (Michel, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 624 (Linn, J., dissenting).
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equivalents. The Festo majority misread Warner-Jenkinson regarding the
scope of equivalents after prosecution history estoppel because Warner-
Jenkinson implies that a scope of equivalents is available after a
narrowing claim amendment has been made for a patentability reason. In
addition, Festo leads to absurd results in the context of after-arising
technology. Moreover, the Festo decision conflicts with patent law's
policy of rewarding pioneer inventions. The Supreme Court should
overrule Festo and apply the flexible approach to prosecution history
estoppel in cases of infringement by after-arising technology.
A. Festo Leaves Patentees Vulnerable to Infringement by After-Arising
Technology
Festo's strict approach to prosecution history estoppel frustrates the
ability of the doctrine of equivalents to protect patentees against after-
arising technology. A primary purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to
provide protection against after-arising technology.'85 This protection is
necessary because, by definition, after-arising technology is unknown at
the time the claims are drafted.
Under Festo, a patentee loses the protection provided by the doctrine
of equivalents if the claims are amended during prosecution of the
patent. 186 Yet, patent applications are amended routinely in present patent
practice. Therefore, most patents will not enjoy the protection against
after-arising technology provided by the doctrine of equivalents.
It is unclear whether the Festo majority considered the effect of its
decision on infringement protection against after-arising technology.
Nowhere in its opinion does the majority address the clear need for the
doctrine of equivalents to accommodate after-arising technology. The
court failed to correctly apply Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
precedent, which states that the doctrine of equivalents protects patentees
from infringement by after-arising technology.' In addition, the
majority failed to respond to Judge Rader's dissent, which warned of the
185. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; Festo, 234 F.3d at 619 (Rader, J., dissenting);
Martin J. Adelman, Is the Use of the Doctrine of EquivalentsTto Fix Mistakes a Mistake?, 27 N. KY.
L REV. 1021, 1023 (2000) ("[Cjovering afler-arising equivalents should be the central function of a
judicially administered doctrine of equivalents.").
186. Festo, 234 F.3d at 563-64.
187. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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absurd results that Festo would have when applied to cases of after-
arising technology.'88
The Festo majority's assertion that the increase in notice by the strict
approach would promote innovation is incorrect. The Festo majority
concluded that the "complete bar" rule would promote innovation by
giving researchers certainty as to the scope of a patent's claims. 89 A
claim that was narrowed during prosecution would be limited to its literal
terms, thereby permitting inventors to design around the patent without
fear of infringement litigation over the remaining scope of equivalents.'90
However, the "complete bar" rule will actually encourage copying of
patented inventions and thus hinder future innovation. The purpose of the
patent system is to encourage technological innovation by protecting a
patentee's inventions.'9 ' One dissenting judge cited empirical studies
showing that a loss of potential profits due to weak patent protection
reduces the amount of investment in new technology research. 92 By
restricting the availability of the doctrine of equivalents, Festo decreases
the protection provided by a patent and, thus, diminishes the financial
value of a patent. Consequently, the incentive to obtain a patent is
reduced, discouraging public disclosure of innovation. 93
Moreover, the Festo majority's "complete bar" rule fails to increase
the notice function of claims in the context of after-arising technology.
The notice function of claims is inherently murky, especially when
involving after-arising technology.'94 The Festo court concluded that
when claims are restricted to their literal terms, uncertainty regarding
infringement is eliminated."' By definition, after-arising technology was
not known at the time the claims were drafted. Therefore, even when
only literal infringement applies, it is unclear whether the claims cover
188. See id. at 619-20 (Rader, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 577.
190. Id
191. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989); Festo, 234
F.3d at 621 (Linn, J., dissenting).
192. Festo, 234 F.3d at 641 (Newman, J., dissenting).
193. See Joseph N. Hosteny, Does Festo Change Patent Prosecution?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
May 2001, at 45.
194. Cf Brief for Amicus Curiae Chiron Corporation in Support of Respondent, Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), available at 1996 WL 254689, * 19-
20.
195. Festo, 234 F.3d at 575-76.
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after-arising technology because the claims were drafted without after-
arising technology in mind.
B. Festo Did Not Appropriately Apply Warner-Jenkinson
The Festo majority failed to consider the language of the Warner-
Jenkinson decision regarding the scope of equivalents available after
prosecution history estoppel. The majority read Warner-Jenkinson as
only addressing cases of unexplained amendments, and concluded that
the opinion did not speak to the issue of a range of equivalents after
prosecution history estoppel.196 In such a situation, the doctrine of
equivalents would be completely barred. 97 The patentee could only
avoid the complete bar rule by establishing that the amendment was
made for reasons unrelated to patentability. 8 In effect, the Festo
majority drew Warner-Jenkinson's "complete bar" line between reasons
related to patentability and reasons unrelated to patentability.'99
According to the Festo majority, a patentee must prove that a claim
element was amended for reasons unrelated to patentability; if the
patentee fails this burden, then the prosecution history bars the doctrine
of equivalents for that element.2
Warner-Jenkinson holds that the complete bar to the doctrine of
equivalents applies only when the Warner-Jenkinson presumption arises
and cannot be rebutted.2"' In other words, when a patentee cannot prove
why a claim element was narrowed, a court should presume that the
claim was amended for a reason related to patentability and therefore the
claim should have no scope of equivalents.2 2 If neither the prosecution
history nor the patentee can show the reason for an amendment, a court
has no information to determine what subject matter was relinquished by
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 586.
199. Id. Judge Gajarsa, a member of the Festo majority, argued in another case that Warner-
Jenkinson equates amendments made for unknown reasons with amendments made for patentability
reasons, both of which should create a complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents. Litton Sys., Inc.
v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
200. Festo, 234 F.3d at 586.
201. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997).
202. Id. at 33.
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the patent applicant. °3 In such a situation, in deference to the policy of
notice, the court must assume the worst case scenario-that the applicant
gave up all scope of equivalents for that claim element.0 4
In addition, the Festo majority ignored what Warner-Jenkinson
suggested regarding the scope of equivalents available for a claim
element following a patentability amendment. As the majority correctly
stated, Warner-Jenkinson's holding did not directly address this issue.
205
However, as Federal Circuit cases206 and commentators 2 7 have
recognized, Warner-Jenkinson implies that a scope of equivalents is
available after a narrowing claim amendment has been made for reasons
related to patentability. The Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule
invoking a complete bar regardless of the reasons for a claim
amendment.0 8 Such a rule would upset the expectation of patent
applicants and the PTO that a flexible approach to estoppel would be
available.209 The PTO rejects patent applications based on the expectation
that narrowing amendments made by the patent applicant will not
automatically preclude all range of equivalents.2 10 The Court avers that
the reasons for a claim amendment must be explored. T
C. The Festo Decision Leads to Odd Results in Protecting Patentees
from Infringement by After-Arising Technology
Festo's complete bar rule leads to absurd results when applied to
after-arising technology. While two claims may have identical scope, an
amended claim will be precluded from the doctrine of equivalents while
an unamended claim will not. Also, Festo creates inequality between the
predictable arts and the unpredictable arts. Because patent applicants in
the unpredictable arts cannot write broad claims that meet the
enablement requirement, these inventions will receive less protection
than predictable arts.
203. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33-34; see also Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices,
172 F.3d 817, 831-32 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
204. Sextant Avionique, 172 F.3d at 831-32.
205. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 81.
207. See supra note 82.
208. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 32.
209. See id. at 32 n.6.
210. Seeid. at32.
211. Seeid. at 33 n.7.
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1. Festo Protects Unamended Claims but Not Amended Claims
The primary purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to protect
patentees from infringement by after-arising technology."' Festo creates
incongruous results because it protects patents with unamended claims
against after-arising technology, but not patents with amended claims."1 3
Patentees cannot rely on literal infringement to protect their rights
against technology that was not known at the time the patent was drafted.
Patentees should be able to bring an infringement suit under the
doctrine of equivalents against future technologies regardless of whether
a claim was amended. A patent applicant could not have given up subject
matter that was not known at the time of the claim amendment. A patent
system must include methods to handle after-arising equivalents that
were not known, and thus not claimable, at the time the meaning of the
claims was fixed."' Because the meaning of claims is fixed at the issue
date, the doctrine of equivalents must be available to all patentees to
protect themselves against after-arising technology.
2. After Festo, Predictable Arts Can Still Use Literal Infringement for
Protection from After-Arising Technology, but Unpredictable Arts
Cannot
A patentee barred by Festo from applying the doctrine of equivalents
may still find infringement under literal infringement if the invention is a
predictable art, but would have no such opportunity if the art is
unpredictable. Festo creates unequal protection for different types of
technologies. The complete bar rule of Festo leaves patentees of
unpredictable arts with no means of enforcing their rights against
infringers using after-arising technology.
Patents in the unpredictable arts depend on the doctrine of equivalents
for protection against infringement by after-arising technology. The
patentee cannot disclose the after-arising technology because it was not
known at the time of patent issuance. Because the claims of
unpredictable arts are limited to the specific embodiments disclosed in
the specification, a patent in the unpredictable arts cannot reach after-
212. See Adelman, supra note 185, at 1023.
213. 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 69
U.S.LW. 3779 (June 18,2001) (No. 00-1543).
214. SeeAdelman, supra note 185, at 1023.
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arising technology through literal infringement.1 5 The patent holder of
an unpredictable art will have to rely on the doctrine of equivalents for
protection from an equivalent based on after-arising technology. If a
claim of an unpredictable art has been amended during prosecution for
reasons related to patentability, Festo would completely bar the
application of the doctrine of equivalents. If the invention was in a
predictable art, inventors may still be able to protect their rights through
literal infringement of a broad claim, but the inventor in an unpredictable
art would have no such recourse.
Inventions in the predictable arts, such as mechanical or electrical
inventions, can enable broad claims that capture after-arising technology
under literal infringement. Because predictable arts can enable broad
literal claims, they may be able to cover the after-arising technology
through literal infringement.216 For example, in Hughes, the after-arising
technology could have been covered literally by a broad claim.217 The
accused device performed the same function, using the same operation as
the patented invention. 218 The only difference was the physical location
where the function was being performed.2 9 The patent drafter could have
drafted broad claims that included computing the positioning figures by a
ground station or a microprocessor on board the satellite.220 Because
electronics is a predictable art, the claims likely would have been
enabling.221 Had the patent in Hughes contained broad literal claims, the
patentee may not have needed the doctrine of equivalents to achieve a
finding of infringement against the after-arising technology.
A lack of protection against after-arising technology in the
unpredictable arts would decrease the value of these patents and
discourage innovation. Research into unpredictable arts, such as
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, is expensive and time consuming
and there is no guarantee of success.222 Companies will be less willing to
spend money on projects involving the unpredictable arts due to an
215. ADELMAN, supra note 3, § 3.4, at 3-40.18.
216. ADELMAN, supra note 3, § 3.4, at 3-40.18.
217. Adelman & Francione, supra note 55, at 712-14.
218. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
219. Id.
220. Adelman & Francione, supra note 55, at 713-14.
221. Adelman & Francione, supra note 55, at 713-14.
222. See Luke Timmerman, Flush Biotechs Not Worried About Slowdown, SEATTLE TIMES, June
23, 2001, at El.
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inability to protect their investments against after-arising technology.
The Festo "complete bar" rule permits competitors in the unpredictable
arts to make an insubstantial substitution to a claim element using after-
arising technology without fear of infringement litigation.
D. The Festo Decision Conflicts with the Policy ofRewarding Pioneer
Inventions
Festo frustrates the patent law policy of rewarding inventors for
pioneering inventions. Pioneer inventions gain the benefit of broader
claims because the claims can be drafted without being limited by prior
art.2 23 Also, during the litigation of pioneer inventions, the doctrine of
equivalents will be limited neither by prior art nor by prosecution history
estoppel based on prior art rejections.2 4 The Federal Circuit recognizes
that pioneer inventions are justly rewarded for their contribution to
science by broad claim coverage and no limits to the doctrine of
equivalents. 25
Festo may deny an inventor the reward of broad claim interpretation
for a pioneering invention. Under Festo, narrowing claim amendments
made in response to prior art rejections and Section 112 rejections will
preclude the doctrine of equivalents in future litigation. By definition,.
pioneer inventions do not encounter PTO rejections based on prior art,
but may make amendments to overcome patentability rejections under
Section 112 because of the difficulty in adequately describing a new area
of science. 2 6 Thus, under Festo, an inventor who needs to make a
narrowing amendment due to the inherent difficulty of drafting claims
for pioneering inventions may not be able to use the doctrine of
equivalents in future litigation. Festo's bright-line rule unfairly restricts
the rights of pioneer inventors to literal infringement only. However,
because nearly all infringement of pioneering inventions will be from
after-arising technology,2 7 pioneer inventors will rely on the doctrine of
equivalents during infringement litigation. Thus, under Festo, an
inventor of a pioneering invention may have less protection than
223. Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
224. Id. at 1301-02.
225. Id.
226. Brief for Amicus Curiae Chiron Corporation in Support of Respondent, Wamer-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), available at 1996 WL 254689, *17.
227. ADELMAN, supra note 3, § 3.4[1], at 3-42.30(22).
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someone who makes only an incremental improvement in a well-
developed field of science. 8 Such an outcome contradicts the Federal
Circuit's policy that pioneering patent claims deserve a broader scope as
a reward for venturing into new areas of science.
E. Festo Should Have Permitted the Flexible Approach to Prosecution
History Estoppel in Cases of Infringement by After-Arising
Technology
The Supreme Court should overrule Festo and apply the flexible
approach to prosecution history estoppel when faced with accused
infringement by after-arising technology. 9 The purpose of the patent
system is to encourage technological innovation by protecting patentees'
inventions. In cases of after-arising technology, patentees cannot rely on
literal infringement for protection; the claims may not literally cover the
after-arising technology at the time the claims were drafted. Therefore,
patentees need the doctrine of equivalents if they are to protect
themselves against after-arising technology. The flexible approach gives
a court the opportunity to determine if the patent still covers the after-
arising technology even after the patentee has made a narrowing
amendment for reasons related to patentability. The fact that a claim was
amended during the application process should not mindlessly prohibit
the doctrine of equivalents against infringing equivalents that gain the
benefit of new technology.
The Festo majority's decision to limit infringement protection against
after-arising technology provided by the doctrine of equivalents is
troublesome. While promoting certainty in the patent system and
emphasizing the notice function of claims is important, these goals
should not be accomplished by completely sacrificing patentees'
protection against after-arising technology. Also, the majority completely
failed to consider the effect its decision would have in the context of
after-arising technology. A flexible approach would maintain the proper
balance between the notice function of claims and the fair protection of
patentees. Instead, the majority precluded application of the doctrine of
228. Brief for Amicus Curiae Chiron Corporation in Support of Respondent, Wamer-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), available at 1996 WL 254689, * 19-20.
229. See ADELMAN, supra note 3, § 3.5, at 3-42.56(14)-(16) (advocating scope of equivalents in
cases of after-arising technology); see also Phillips, supra note 11l, at 180-81 (arguing that doctrine
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equivalents in many cases and, consequently, left patentees exposed to
copyists clever enough to use after-arising technology to avoid
infringement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Festo decision runs contrary to the major function of the doctrine
of equivalents-protecting patent holders from after-arising technology.
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent expressly advocate
maintaining the doctrine of equivalents so that patentees can take action
against accused infringers using new technologies. The Festo majority
created a "complete bar" rule to promote certainty in the patent system
and to emphasize the notice function of patent claims. The court failed to
consider important language in Warner-Jenkinson-as well as Federal
Circuit precedent interpreting Warner-Jenkinson-that permits a scope
of equivalents after a narrowing claim amendment for reasons related to
patentability.
The Festo court failed to consider the impact of its decision in patent
suits against accused devices using after-arising equivalents. The Festo
decision prejudices patents in the unpredictable arts, which cannot enable
broad claims as easily as those in the predictable arts. The application of
the complete bar rule also runs contrary to the policy that pioneer
inventions should be rewarded with broad claim coverage.
The Supreme Court should overrule Festo's complete bar rule and
allow the flexible approach to prosecution history estoppel in all cases of
infringement by after-arising technology. The Court needs to correct the
imbalance that Festo created between the notice function of claims and
the fair protection of patented inventions.
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